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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from which this Petition of Certiorari is taken are Jack C. 
Daniels and Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association. 
Jack C. Daniels died on or about February 26, 1989. 
Suggestion of Death on the record was made in the Court of 
Appeals, but no substitution of parties has been ordered. This 
Petition is authorized by Alice Daniels, widow of the said Jack C. 
Daniels, and substitution of parties will be made as may be 
directed by this court. 
It is the belief of counsel for petitioner that this 
action sounding in contract has not abated. 
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PETITION FOR 
• WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Third-party plaintiff and appellant, Jack C. Daniels, 
hereby petitions the Supreme Court of Utah for Writ of Certiorari 
to review Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this action. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
l.A. Where general contractor on condominium project is 
induced by project owners not to file lien within the 100-day 
filing period, are owners estopped from pleading untimely filing 
as a defense to contractor's lien rights; and B. Is a subsequent 
lender who derived his trust deed interest through the aforesaid 
project owners after recording of said mechanic's lien and with 
actual notice thereof likewise estopped? 
2.A. On appeal from Judgment of the lower court on 
Motion to Dismiss, can the Court of Appeals determine as a matter 
of law that sums payable to general contractor under "cost-plus" 
building contract were nonlienable "investor profits," rather than 
for services and materials furnished on the job which are 
lienable? and B. Does an ownership interest preclude a 
contractor from asserting a lien for labor performed or materials 
furnished on the job? 
3. Does the Decision of the Court of Appeals written 
by Judge Davidson in which the other two judges on the panel 
concur in the result, but write no opinions, satisfy the 
requirement of Rule 30(c), Rules of the Court of Appeals, 
requiring the "reasons" for the decision of the Court of Appeals 
to be set forth in writing? 
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was designated for 
publication and is found at 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (See Appendix) 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION 
OF SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED 
A. Date of entry of decision sought to be reviewed: 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered April 5, 1989. 
B. Date of entry of any order respecting rehearing: 
Order denying Appellant's Petition for Rehearing was entered April 
26, 1989. There has been no order granting extension of time. 
C. Crosspetition: None. 
D. Jurisdiction to review conferring jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court: The statutory provision believed to confer on 
the Supreme Court of Utah jurisdiction to review decision of the 
Court of Appeals by Writ of Certiorari is 78-2-2(5)f 78-2a-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, and Title VIf Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
E. Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, 
ordinances and regulations: 
Rule 30(c), Rules of Utah Court of Appeals (See Appendix); 
Section 38-1-3, UCA (1981/82 version) set forth in Appendix; 
Section 38-1-7, UCA (1981/82 version) set forth in Appendix; 
Section 57-3-2, UCA (1981/82 version) set forth in Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. This action was commenced in the 
lower court by plaintiff, CEN Corporation, against Daniels and 
certain other defendants, seeking to cancel of record a mechanic's 
lien filed by Daniels. In the lower court Daniels sought, by 
Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint (see Appendix), to 
foreclose his mechanic's lien against third-party defendant and 
respondent, Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, and others. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. Respondent, Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter referred to as "Deseret 
Federal"), when served with Third-party Complaint seeking 
foreclosure of mechanic's lien, filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
alleged failure of Daniels to state a claim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. The lower court granted 
Motion to Dismiss of Deseret Federal by Memorandum Decision (see 
Appendix) and thereupon entered "Summary Judgment" (see Appendix) 
in favor of the said respondent. 
By its decision entered April 5, 1989, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1980 a joint venture known as Park Avenue Development 
Company was formed, consisting of Kenneth Sitzburger, Michael 
McCoy, Resort Consultants, Ltd., a Utah general partnership, and 
JML, a Utah limited partnership. The general partner of JML was a 
corporation known as Milajack Corporation. The limited partners 
of JML were appellant, Jack C. Daniels, Michael Dangerfield, Larry 
Lunnell and Kent Fuller. Daniels invested $28,000 in JML, 
Dangerfield $18,000, Fuller $28,000, and Lunnell $6,000. The 
entire $80,000 was invested by JML in Park Avenue Development 
Company on behalf of JML for a 20% interest in said joint venture. 
(See pages 10-13, 21-23, and 69-70 of Daniels' deposition in 
Appendix hereto.) In addition to the foregoing, the joint 
venture, Park Avenue Development Company, entered into a separate 
Building Contract Agreement with appellant, Jack C. Daniels, dba 
JD Construction (see Appendix). 
The Building Contract Agreement was a cost-plus contract 
and provided that Daniels, as contractor, be paid: 
"Article VIII. It is hereby mutually agreed between 
the parties hereto that the sum to be paid by PARK AVENUE 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY to the CONTRACTOR for said work and 
materials shall be $757,000.00 SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN 
AND NO/100 Dollars plus profit and overhead of $80,253.00 
EIGHTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE AND NO/100. 
"This payment shall be made within 60 days after 
this contract is fulfilled." 
The $80,253 was intended to be approximately 10% of out-
of-pocket costs. (See pages 10-13, 21-23, and 69-70 of Daniels 
deposition in Appendix.) 
Daniels completed his work as contractor on the eight-
plex in the summer of 1981, however, the property owner was trying 
to obtain refinancing and, prior to expiration of the 100-day 
period, requested that Daniels not lien the property and 
represented that if Daniels would refrain from so doing, Daniels 
would be paid the balance of his contractor's fee of $80,253 (not 
JML's 20% interest in the project) within two weeks. In reliance 
thereon Daniels did not lien the property within the usual 100 
days provided by Utah lien law, 38-1-7, UCA. 
Thereafter, on or about December 1, 1981, the pipes in 
the eight-plex froze. The owner called Daniels claiming that 
Daniels had not properly completed the job, thus resulting in the 
frozen pipes, and asked that he return to the jobsite. Daniels 
returned on December 1, 1981, to seek the cause and extent of 
damage and to commence any necessary work. There he ascertained 
the problem, made estimates of cost, called subcontractors and 
made inquiries regarding insurance coverage. The developers, 
apparently fearing that they had made a mistake in asking Daniels 
to return to the property and thereby extend his lien rights, 
dismissed him and did not permit him to do any further work on the 
premises. 
Daniels filed his lien February 3, 1982. Thereafter, on 
February 22, 1982, Deseret Federal, refinanced the property for 
the then-owner, and Note and Trust Deeds were executed that date 
and recorded March 1, 1982, almost one month after the recording 
of Daniels' Notice of Lien. Although discovery was never 
completed in this case, as a Motion to Dismiss was granted, it is 
clear that before loaning on the property Deseret Federal received 
a title report and thus had actual knowledge of the Daniels lien. 
The original owner assigned its rights in the project to 
CEN Corporation, and CEN Corporation filed suit against Daniels 
and other defendants on or about February 25, 1982, seeking to 
cancel Daniels' mechanic's lien. Daniels filed Answer and Counter-
claim and also, with leave of the court, Amendment to Counterclaim 
and Third-Party Complaint seeking foreclosure of his lien. 
Deseret Federal filed a Motion to Dismiss for alleged 
failure to state a claim, and the court granted said motion and 
entered "Summary Judgment" (R. 243 & in Appendix) in favor of 
Deseret Federal. The lower court's reasoning was that the work 
done in December was not sufficient to extend Daniels' lien 
rights, and that Deseret Federal was "not in privity with Daniels" 
and unless Deseret Federal itself committed the conduct consti-
tuting an estoppel, estoppel by its predecessor in title was not 
available against it. (R. 238 & in Appendix) 
Daniels appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court by an opinion filed April 5, 1989, written by Judge 
Davidson (see Appendix). Judge Regnal W. Garff and Judge Norman 
H. Jackson "concurred" in the result, but did not file a separate 
opinion or opinions. 
The minority opinion by Judge Davidson found that the 
work done in December was not sufficient to extend Daniels1 lien 
rights, and further determined as a matter of law that the 
"$80,000" owing to Daniels was money owed to him as an "investor" 
and not as a contractor, and was therefore not lienable, and Judge 
Davidson said that for that reason he did "not need to reach the 
merits of the estoppel argument." In Note 1 on page 5, however, 
Judge Davidson stated: 
"It is undisputed that approximately $15,000 was paid to . 
Daniels for his services as contractor. What the 'overhead1 
represented is unclear. In any case, failure to properly 
preserve the lien right precludes any claim that this 
overhead should be the subject of a lien." (Emphsis added.) 
In the footnote Judge Davidson thus determines that 
estoppel is not available to Daniels. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
Special and important reasons, within the meaning of 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, exist for review of the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. Although petitioner believes 
that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the work done 
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by Daniels in December 1981 did not extend his lien rights, that 
error is not asserted as the basis justifying the granting of this 
petition. The more important issue is whether Daniels is in any 
event entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of estoppel to 
extend his lien rights. The handling of the estoppel issue by the 
Court of Appeals is not only error, but error involving the Utah 
building and finance industries and the application of the 
recording act to mechanic's liens. 
POINT I.A. JACK C. DANIELS, GENERAL CONTRACTOR ON 
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, WAS INDUCED BY PROJECT OWNERS NOT TO FILE 
LIEN WITHIN NORMAL 100-DAY FILING PERIOD, AND OWNERS ARE THEREBY 
ESTOPPED FROM PLEADING UNTIMELY FILING OF NOTICE LIEN IN DEFENSE 
TO LIEN FORECLOSURE. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO SO 
RULE, AND SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS EXIST FOR THIS COURT TO 
REVIEW THAT ERROR. 
The decision as to whether or not an owner can be 
estopped by conduct from asserting the defense of failure to file 
a mechanic's lien within the 100 days provided by statute is a 
special and important question of state law which has not been, 
but should be, settled by this court, and meets the requirements 
of Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
This court has held that an insurance company is 
estopped to assert the statute of limitations in a personal injury 
matter by reason of representations made by insurance adjusters to 
injured persons, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such 
statute of limitations and even in the absence of actual fraud. 
See Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Ut 2d 22f 456 P2d 159. We 
respectfully submit that the same arguments in favor of estoppel 
in that situation support it here. 
In Rice the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of 
an employee of the defendant school district, was repeatedly 
assured by the insurance adjuster that she would be compensated 
for her damages as soon as they were ascertainedr and was thereby 
misled into waiting beyond the statutory filing period under the 
Governmental Immunity Act of the State of Utah before she in fact 
filed her action. The school board then raised the statute of 
limitations as a defense. The Utah Supreme Court, speaking on 
that issuef said: 
"Even if the one-year limitation of Section 63-30-15 be 
deemed mandatory, this court has previously held: . . . 
Waiver or estoppel may be found in the face of a mandatory 
statute. For instance, statutes of limitation ordinarily are 
mandatory both in form and effect. Nevertheless, they may be 
waived or the party may be estopped from relying upon them... 
"Hence the filing of the claim within ninety days, 
while mandatory upon the claimant and a condition precedent to 
his cause of action, is nothing more than a procedural 
requirement as to the agency, which, as to the claimant may be 
excused by estoppel. 
"In Benner v. Industrial Ace. Comm., supra, 26 Cal 2d 
346, 349, 159 P2d 24, 26, the court said, 'Where, as here, the 
delay in commencing action was induced by the conduct of the 
party sought to be charged the latter may not invoke such 
conduct to defeat recovery. An estoppel may arise although 
there was no designed fraud on the part of the person sought 
to be estopped. Where the delay in commencing action is 
induced by the conduct of the defendant, it cannot be availed 
of by him as a defense.1" 
_ Q _ 
Minnesota has held that estoppel is available in 
mechanic's lien cases. The case of Beltline Brick Company v. 
Standard Home Building Company, 213 NW 41 (Minn. 1927) is on all 
fours with the instant case although labeled without justification 
by the lower court as an "aberration." 
In the Beltline case the plaintiff furnished brick for 
the construction of a building owned by defendant's predecessor in 
title. Defendant claimed that plaintiff had not timely filed the 
lien. The court stated in that case: 
"The court found that there was an implied agreement 
between the parties, arising out of such transaction, to 
extend the time for filing a lien statement, that the 
building company is, by its conduct estopped to assert or 
contend that such brick was not furnished for use upon the 
premises or that the lien statement was filed too late, and 
that the defendant, Ella T. Robitschek, is a grantee after 
the filing of said lien statement, is also subject to such 
estoppel. Upon these matters the evidence amply sustains 
the findings and the findings support the conclusion." 
Judge Davidson, although claiming in the body of the 
opinion that he does not reach the estoppel issue, nevertheless 
reaches it in Footnote 1. When he there condemns Daniels for 
"failure to properly preserve the lien right," he decides that 
Daniels has no estoppel rights. The majority of the Court of 
Appeals do not concur in that reasoning, but rather affirm the 
lower court without opinion (which is error in and of itself—see 
Point III), and that necessarily constitutes an affirmance of all 
findings and adjudications of the lower court. See Carr v. 
Hoffman, 256 NY 254, 176 NE 383, at page 390 (Ct of Appeals of NY, 
1931). See also Cushman v. Day, 602 P.2d 327 (Oregon 1979). 
_i n _ 
One of the necessary rulings of the lower court was that 
Daniels had no estoppel claim against Deseret Federal because of 
lack of privity. The fact that the opinion is designated for 
publication indicates that the panel wants the public and the 
business and legal community to have the opinion to govern their 
affairs, and the opinion case thus stands for the proposition that 
estoppel is not available in mechanic's lien cases, at least as 
against a party who does not do the act giving rise to the 
estoppel. This is error, and error in a special and important 
area of commerce, to-wit, the building industry and the financing 
industry. The matter is one of first impression in Utah, and 
ought to be decided by this court. 
POINT I.B. IS A SUBSEQUENT LENDER WHO DERIVED HIS TRUST 
DEED INTEREST FROM THE AFORESAID OWNER AFTER THE RECORDING OF THE 
SAID MECHANIC'S LIEN, LIKEWISE SUBJECT TO THE SAME ESTOPPEL? 
In the lower court Judge Fishier held estoppel 
unavailable as there was no "privity" between Deseret Federal and 
Daniels. Affirmance without a majority opinion is an affirmance 
of that ruling. 
It seems clear that anyone holding through the original 
owner ijs in privity with that owner. One owner can only obtain 
his interest from a prior one, and Deseret Federal can only 
acquire its trust deed rights from the owner. 
- i l -
In Smith vs. Oregon Shortline Railroad Co,, 30 Ut 246, 84 P 
108 (1906), the Utah Supreme Court held that a subsequent owner is 
estopped by the conduct of his predecessor in title: 
" . . . if respondent's grantor at the time of his 
conveyance was estopped from maintaining an action of 
ejectment for the additional strips taken, then likewise is 
the respondent estopped from maintaining such action." 
If a lender holding under the owner is not put on notice 
by the recording of the mechanic's lien, the protection of the 
recording act (Section 5 7-3-2, UCA) is seriously undermined, if 
not destroyed. No affidavit was filed by Deseret Federal denying 
actual notice, and therefore actual notice must be deemed 
established for purposes of Deseret Federal's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court of Appeals holds at least that a lender can 
totally ignore a written mechanic's lien of which it has 
constructive and actual notice if the validity of lien rests upon 
estoppel. The holding implies that the lender has no duty of 
inquiry, which seriously undermines the recording statute, and is 
a matter which requires the attention of this court as being an 
important question of state law in accordance with Rule 43(4). 
Also, although there is no Utah case precisely on point, 
we believe that up until now, in the light of the decisions of 
this court uniformly upholding the letter and spirit of the 
recording act [See for example Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Ut 55, 1 P2d 
242 (1931)], it has been generally assumed that one taking subject 
to a recorded mechanic's lien took subject to whatever the holder 
of that lien was able to prove for it. That no longer appears to 
_1 0_ 
be the case. We respectfully submit that this circumstance brings 
the case within the provisions of Rule 43(2) of this court as 
being "in conflict" with decisions of this court. 
POINT II.A. ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS (WHICH WAS DENOMINATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY 
THE LOWER COURT), THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT DETERMINE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT SUMS PAYABLE TO GENERAL CONTRACTOR PURSUANT TO 
"COST-PLUS" BUILDING CONTRACT WERE "INVESTOR PROFITS" AND NOT 
LIENABLE, RATHER THAN FOR SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED ON THE 
JOB, WHICH ARE LIENABLE. 
We respectfully submit that the opinion of Judge 
Davidson holding as a matter of law that the $80,000 owing to 
Daniels under the cost-plus Building Contract Agreement was 
investment money clearly falls within Rule 43(3), which provides: 
"When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision." 
It is axiomatic that on a motion to dismiss every 
alleged fact and reasonable inference therefrom must be construed 
in favor of the party against whom the motion to dismiss is 
asserted. The issue of whether or not the $80,000 was profit or 
money owing to Daniels for labor and materials performed on the 
job was never even raised in the lower court. It was first raised 
by Judge Davidson. It is a matter that was not argued to, nor 
found by Judge Fishier, and Daniels has never had an opportunity 
to meet it. In his pleadings and in his lien Daniels alleges that 
-l -*-
he seeks recovery for labor and materials furnished. If it is 
necessary to affirmatively allege that he does not seek investor 
profits, then he should be allowed to amend. 
Daniels invested in the joint venture (Park Avenue 
Development Company) not in his own name, but only by virtue of 
being a limited partner in JML, one of the joint venturers of the 
development. How Judge Davidson was able to say that the Building 
Contract Agreement which was executed in Daniels' own name is 
somehow investment money due him as such as a limited partner of a 
limited partnership of which he is only one member is 
incomprehensible. 
If there is any ambiguity in the Building Contract, then 
Daniels should be able to submit parol evidence to explain it. It 
is clear that the Building Contract Agreement is nothing more than 
a "cost-plus" contract, and it is clear that "cost-plus" contracts 
are lienable. Any contract for improvements to real property 
involves out-of-pocket costs, overhead and profit to the 
contractor. Any contractor who attempts to charge only for out-of-
pocket will soon be bankrupt. Where Daniels completed the 
contract, and in so doing expended the out-of-pocket $757,000 (the 
"cost" part of "cost-plus"), he was entitled to the "plus" part of 
the "cost-plus of $80,253 as agreed by the parties. See Mathis v. 
Thunderbird Village, Inc., 236 Oregon 425, 389 P2d 343 (1964) and 
also 53 Am Jur 2d, Mechanic's Liens, Section 107. In Mathis the 
court said: 
_ 1 > 1 _ 
"We held there that that portion of the overhead 
expense attributable to the job could be included in 
determining the reasonable value of the labor for the 
job. The issue here is not reasonable value, but 
contract price, computed upon a cost-plus basis, and we 
cannot observe any distinction when considering the 
question of lienability." 
Judge Davidson's conclusion that Daniels is seeking 
investor profits is totally unjustified. Daniels in his lien and 
in his pleadings asks compensation for labor and materials. The 
contract provides that he is to be paid sixty days after 
completion. Investors will not be paid until the condominiums are 
sold. In Footnote 1 Judge Davidson acknowledges that he does not 
know what overhead consists of. Daniels was not required on 
Motion to Dismiss, where the issue was not raised, to plead any 
detail as to overhead. The $15,000 which Daniels received was 
received for his actual labor on the job and is not part of the 
$80,000 which he was to receive for overhead and for the 
responsibility he assumed as general contractor. Certainly the 
court cannot say as a matter of law that no part of the $80,253 is 
recoverable. Daniels is entitled to develop that subject 
factually before the appellate court rules as a matter of law that 
he has absolutely no rights. 
POINT II.B. JUDGE DAVIDSON ERRONEOUSLY ELIMINATES 
OWNERS, AS A CLASS, FROM MECHANIC'S LIEN RIGHTS. 
In disqualifying Daniels from lien rights by virtue of 
his position as a limited partner as a matter of law, Judge 
Davidson appears to be eliminating owners, as a class, from being 
able to assert mechanic's lien rights, without citing any case law 
or statutory law supporting that conclusion. Judge Davidson's 
conclusions effectively rewrite construction contracts, and it 
also rewrites the lien statute, apparently eliminating therefrom 
any lien protection for anyone with any ownership interest in a 
project. 
It is obvious that this distinction opens a whole new 
field to unscrupulous developers who now, by using the contract 
vehicle of sharing small percentages of ownership with contractors 
and thereby allowing them to participate in "profits," can by that 
device unwittingly destroy the contractor's (or subcontractor's) 
lien rights. The potential for fraud seems unlimited. 
Judge Davidson's opinion purports to disqualify a whole 
class of citizens from the benefits of the mechanic's lien statute 
without the benefit of any safeguards. In the past such major 
changes, if undertaken by the legislature, had the benefit of the 
lobbying process and multiple hearings and readings before such a 
change became law. Even changes through the courts in the past 
have been accomplished by full briefing, argument and full 
consideration on the part of the court. Judge Davidson's decision 
dispenses with all of the foregoing safeguards. A matter of such 
importance deserves full consideration and a decision by the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
POINT III. DOES THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
WRITTEN BY JUDGE DAVIDSON IN WHICH THE OTHER TWO JUDGES ON THE 
_ 1 C -
PANEL CONCUR IN THE RESULT, BUT WRITE NO OPINIONS, SATISFY THE 
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 30(c)f RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
REQUIRING THE "REASONS" FOR THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS TO BE SET FORTH IN WRITING? 
Rule 30(c), Rules of Utah Court of Appeals provides: 
"When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, 
modified, or affirmed by the court, the reasons therefor 
shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the 
clerk. Any judge on the panel concurring or dissenting 
therefrom may likewise give the reasons in writing and 
file the same with the clerk. . . " (Emphasis added.) 
We respectfully submit that under the circumstances of 
this case the court has not complied with that rule inasmuch as no 
majority opinion has been written, nor have a majority of the 
court written separate opinions. We believe this falls within the 
purview of Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court with 
respect to writs of certiorari and constitutes a circumstance 
where the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has "so 
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings as to call for the exercise of this court's power of 
supervision." Rule 30(c) requires the Court of Appeals to set out 
in writing the "reasons" for its decision. 
We respectfully submit that it is not proper for the 
majority of the court to concur in the result and thereby avoid 
writing an opinion setting forth their reasons. 
We respectfully submit that if the two concurring 
members of the court were in agreement as to the reasons for 
denying Daniels' appeal, their reasons should be set forth in 
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writing as the majority opinion of the court. If their reasons 
differed from the reasons set forth by Judge Davidson, which one 
must assume in this casef and their reasons also differed from 
each other, then we submit that both should have set forth those 
reasons, but in any event one member of the court would have to do 
so in order to have the reasons of any majority of the court set 
forth in writing. Anything less than that does not comply with 
the requirements of Rule 30(c) that "reasons be set forth in 
writing." The word "reasons" can only mean the reasons of the 
majority of the court. 
To fail to state its reasons is not only error, but is a 
very unfortunate omission in the proper administration of justice. 
It conveys a bad image to the unfortunate recipient of such a 
"decision" and to the public. It gives the impression that the 
law is arbitrary and unreasoned and that all men are not after all 
equal before the law. It gives the impression that some men get 
the benefit of the full, careful and reasoned application of the 
law to their case, but that others, for no stated reason, do not. 
This case is not trivial. It presents substantial 
issues. When a litigant is deprived of $80,000, fair play 
requires that he be told why. It deals with matters of first 
impression in Utah and of great moment to the building industry 
and to the public in general. 
The Court of Appeals has clearly decided that it is not 
required to comply with Rule 30(c), but can depart therefrom. 
_1 O — 
This seems to suggest that rules are for the public, and even the 
lawyers, but not for the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, pursuant 
to Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, the Court of 
Appeals, by acting as it has, has "decided an important question 
of state law which should be settled by this court," to-wit: Is 
the Court of Appeals bound by its own rules? 
This court has jurisdiction to make rules for all of the 
courts of the state (Article VIII, Section 4, Constitution of 
Utah), and such rules should be followed. 
Rule 2 of the Court of Appeals appears to allow the 
court to "suspend" a rule and "order proceedings in that case in 
accordance with its direction" for the sole purpose of "expediting 
a decision." There was however no such order entered, nor any 
showing of any urgency to expedite the decision. Furthermore, 
even if the decision needed to be expedited, it could have been 
rendered and the opinion setting forth reasons filed later. The 
Court of Appeals may, under Rule 2, be able in its discretion to 
vary its procedure in a given case in the interest of justice, but 
such discretion is not unlimited and must be exercised in an 
orderly manner so that this court can review it. It is one thing 
to "order" that in a given situation a rule be dispensed with for 
good cause stated. It is another thing to just ignore a rule. 
Publication of the opinion demonstrates that this is not a trivial 
case. 
-1 Q-
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the foregoing arguments 
demonstrate that the issues here involve special and important 
questions of state law which have not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. As to the recording act issue, the decision 
appears to be at variance with prior decisions of this court, and 
the decision of the Court of Appeals so far departs from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and conduct as 
to call for the exercise of this court's power of supervision, and 
that this court should accordingly grant the writ. 
Respectfully submitted: 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. GUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Petitioner, 
Jack C. Daniels 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that four copies of the foregoing Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari were mailed to David R. Olsen, Carl F. Hueffner 
and Charles P. Sampson, attorneys for the respondent, Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan, at their address, 175 South West Temple, 
#700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, the 
day of May, 1989. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 
Controlling provisions of Constitution, statutes, 
ordinances and regulations continued from Paragraph E, 
Page 3. 
Section 38-1-3, UCA (1981/82 version) 
Section 38-1-7, UCA (1981/82 version) 
Section 57-3-2, UCA (1981/82 version) 
Opinion of Court of Appeals 
Order of Court of Appeals denying Petition for Rehearing 
Memorandum Decision of Judge Fishier (R. 233 - 240) 
Summary Judgment of Judge Fishier (R. 243 - 245) 
Building Contract Agreement of August 14, 1980 
Daniels Deposition, Pages 10 - 13, 21 - 23 and 69 - 70 
Notice of Lien 
Third-party Complaint 
Answer and Counterclaim 
Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim 
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not the type of "benefit" proscribed by §70A-
3-304(2). 
Air Terminal also asserts First Federal knew 
the note negotiated by Gump & Ayers was in 
breach of duty because First Federal knew the 
proceeds were to be used to satisfy the Morse 
Shortfall and that Air Terminal was to be 
indemnified from the Morse Shortfall under 
the Purchase and Security Agreement. 
As previously discussed, we consider Air 
Terminal's claim for indemnification against 
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers as a claim ind-
ependent of its liability on the note. Despite 
the indemnity provisions, Gump & Ayers had 
the right to assign Air Terminal's negotiable 
note for the benefit of Sunayers, and did not 
breach its fiduciary duty in doing so. The 
assignment of the note does not vitiate Air 
Terminal's claim of indemnification against 
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers for funds expe-
nded to satisfy the Morse Shortfall. In 
summary, we do not find §70A-3-304(2) 
defeats First Federal's status as a holder in 
due course. 
We hold that the Air Terminal note is a 
negotiable instrument and First Federal is a 
holder in due course. The judgment of the 
trial court is, therefore, reversed, and the case 
is remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Juugc 
1. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-304(l)(b), the pro-
vision at issue in this case, is identical to §3-
304{l)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code referred 
to by the court in Sundsvallsbankcn. 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Jack C. Daniels appeals from a summary 
judgment in favor of Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Association, dismissing his notice to 
hold and claim a lien on property for which he 
was both a co-owner and the general contr-
actor. Daniels' claim concerned the timeliness 
of filing his notice and the profits owed to 
him as a limited partner in Park Avenue 
Development Company ("Park Avenue"). The 
trial court held that his lien was both untimely 
and invalid. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1980, Daniels invested approximately 
$28,000 in the development of an eight-unit 
condominium project in Park City, Utah, 
thereby acquiring an interest through a limited 
partnership in Park Avenue. The agreement 
between Park Avenue and Daniels provided 
that Daniels would receive approximately 
$80,000 for his share in the profits from the 
sale of the condominiums and for overhead. 
Park Avenue also hired Daniels to serve as the 
general contractor for the condominium 
project and agreed to pay him approximately 
$15,000 for his services. 
On August 14, 1980, Deseret approved a 
construction loan to Park Avenue and const-
ruction on the project commenced. By the end 
of July 1981, Daniels had completed all of the 
construction required pursuant to the constr-
uction contract and Park City issued certific-
ates of final inspection and occupancy for the 
project. Daniels was paid $15,000 for services 
and labor, but was not paid his promised 
share of the profits from the sale of the con-
dominiums. 
Apparently, Daniels intended to file a notice 
to hold and claim a lien on the project, for the 
$80,000 "profit/ within the statutory period 
required for filing. However, the owners of 
the project were trying to obtain refinancing 
and they requested Daniels not to file his 
mechanic's lien for the profit and overhead. 
I In return, the owners promised Daniels that 
I they would allocate his share of the profits to 
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him within two weeks. In reliance on this 
promise, Daniels did not file his mechanic's 
lien within the requisite 100 day period. 
However, the promised payment was not 
made. 
On December 1, 1981, several water pipes in 
the condominiums froze. The owners called 
Daniels to inspect the pipes and to make 
repairs. Daniels inspected the pipes and made 
phone calls to subcontractors in order to fac-
ilitate repairs. On February 3, 1982, Daniels 
filed a notice of lien against the project, clai-
ming a lien for the $80,000 'profit.* He listed 
December 1, 1981, as the last day labor had 
been furnished on the project. 
In October 1983, Daniels filed a complaint 
against Deseret to foreclose his claimed lien on 
the property. Deseret's construction loan to 
Park Avenue was secured by deeds of trust 
which Deseret executed February 22, 1982, 
and recorded March 1, 1982. Deseret subseq-
uently moved to dismiss Daniels' complaint 
on the basis that Daniels' lien was not filed in 
a timely fashion as required by Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-7 (1988) and therefore, Daniels 
had no cause of action as a matter of law. 
CEN Corporation, subsequent owner of the 
real property, also moved to declare Daniels' 
lien void. The trial court agreed that Daniels 
had not timely filed a mechanic's lien and 
therefore granted summary judgment in favor 
of Deseret and CEN Corporation. 
Daniels raises two issues on appeal: Did the 
trial court err when it found Daniels' work on 
December 1, 1981, did not extend the time 
limit for filing a notice to hold and claim a 
lien? Did the trial court err when it held 
Deseret is not estopped from raising the affi-
rmative defense that the mechanic's lien was 
not timely filed? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A court may grant summary judgment if the 
evidence shows "that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law/ Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because a 
summary judgment is a matter of law, the 
appellate court gives the trial court's conclu-
sions no particular deference but rather applies 
the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 
(Utah App. 1987). However, *[o]n appeal 
from a summary judgment, we review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the losing 
party." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe Co. 
v. S& H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 
1986). 
TIME OF FILING - EXTENSION 
A general contractor must record a mech-
anic's lien within 100 days after completion of 
the contract. Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 
(1988), Completion is marked by the end of a 
I Savings A Loan Ass'n ~ 
related series of tasks required for substantial 
completion of the contract. "Trivial or minor 
adjustments made casually or long after the 
main work is completed cannot be used to tie 
on to as the last labor done or materials fur-
nished." Wilcox v. Ooward, 88 Utah 503, 56 
P.2d 1,6-7(1936). 
Well over 100 days after completion of the 
contract, Daniels spent a day inspecting the 
damage from the frozen water pipes and 
calling subcontractors in order to make 
repairs. Daniels contends that this extends the 
period for filing his mechanic's lien. However, 
the trial court found: 
The work the owners wanted done 
in December of 1981 was not a 
continuation of the earlier project, 
but merely repairs. If repairs to a 
completed project could be const-
rued as extending the time in which 
a mechanic's lien could be filed, 
mechanic's (sic] liens could be filed 
many years after a project had been 
completed. 
We agree with the trial court's findings. In 
order to extend the time for filing his mech-
anic's lien, the work Daniels did in December 
1981 would have to substantially relate to the 
performance of the contract. "The work done 
or material furnished must be something 
substantial in connection with the performance 
of the contract and this is not satisfied by 
trivialties which may be used as a pretext to 
extend the lien period." Palombi v. D A C 
Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 327 
(1969). 
In Palombi, the original contractor argued 
that the date of completion was the date on 
which the building permit was obtained and 
some remaining building materials were 
removed from the property owner's residence. 
The court held that these were trivial activities 
in light of the substantial completion of the 
contract, and they could not be used to extend 
the date of completion. Similarly, the inspec-
tion and repairs undertaken by Darnels in 
December 1981 were not services used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of 
the building, nor did the services add directly 
to the value of the property. Therefore, the 
inspection cannot extend the time period for 
filing notice of a mechanic's lien. 
SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED 
Daniels contends that Park Avenue and 
subsequent owners are estopped from pleading 
untimely filing of the notice of the lien as an 
affirmative defense because he was induced by 
the project owners not to file a lien within the 
requisite 100 day filing period. Deseret cont-
ends that it had no knowledge of the agree-
ment between Park Avenue and Daniels and 
that it was not in privity with Daniels. Ther-
efore, Deseret argues, estoppel cannot be 
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asserted against it. 
We do not need to reach the merits of the 
estoppel argument. Even if Daniels had filed a 
timely notice for the $80,000 owing to him for 
"profit and overhead," this amount was not 
owed to him for the value of the services he 
rendered or for materials furnished but from 
his ownership in Park Avenue as a limited 
partner. Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 (1988) 
provides that contractors, subcontractors, and 
laborers who furnish material, provide serv-
ices, or bestow labor for the contraction, alt-
eration, or improvement of a building or str-
ucture shall have a lien upon the property for 
the value of the services and material prov-
ided. The value of the services provided by 
Daniels in his performance as general contra-
ctor, was approximately $15,000, for which he 
was compensated.1 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law "is 
to preclude landowners from having their 
lands improved by others, without becoming 
personally responsible for the reasonable value 
of materials and labor." Cox Rock Prod. v. 
Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah 
App. 1988). In order to ascertain when an 
improvement has been made upon the land, 
for purposes of determining whether notice of 
a mechanic's lien can validly be filed, it is 
necessary that "there be an annexation to the 
land, or to some part of the realty; or a 
fixture appurtenant to it, and this must have 
been done with the intention of making it a 
permanent part thereof." King Bros., Inc. v. 
Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah 
1962). 
Daniels' claim is for the profits he was 
entitled to as an investor and not for any 
services or materials that he provided as a 
contractor. The profits a person is entitled to 
as the result of an investment do not consti-
tute improvements to the realty nor do they 
fall within the statutory meaning of services or 
materials as contemplated in the mechanic's 
lien law statutes. Accordingly, Daniels' notice 
to hold and claim a lien, for the profits alle-
gedly owing to him, is invalid. Therefore, the 
summary judment in favor of Deseret is affi-
rmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-104(1 Kb), the pro-
vision at issue in this case, is identical to §3-
304(l)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code referred 
to by the court in Sundsvallsbankea. 
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MECHANICS AND OTHER LIENS 
CHAPTER 169 
H. B. No. 51 (Passed February 19, 1981. In effect May 12. 1981.) 
MECHANICS' LIEN MODIFICATIONS 
AN ACT RELATING TO LIENS; PROVIDING THAT AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF A 
COPY OF THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO CLAIM A LIEN UPON THE OWNER OF THE 
LIENED PROPERTY BE FILED WITH THE COUNTY RECORDER AT THE TIME SUCH 
NOTICE IS FILED. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 38-1-7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 143, LAWS OF UTAH 1979. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
143, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to read: 
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of prop-
erty. 
Every original contractor within 100 days after the completion of his con-
tract, and except as hereafter provided, every person other than the original 
contractor claiming the benefit of this chapter within 80 days after furnishing 
the last material or performing the last labor for or on any land, building, 
improvement or structure, or for any alteration, addition to or repair thereof, 
or performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any mine or 
mining claim, must file for record with the county recorder of the county in 
which the property, or some part thereof, is situated a claim in writing, con-
taining a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien, and a statement of his 
demand after deducting all just credits and offsets, with the name of the 
reputed owner if known or if not known, the name of the record owner, and 
also the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he fur-
nished the material, with a statement of the terms, time given and conditions 
of his contract, specifying the time when the first and last labor was per-
formed, or the first and last material was furnished, and also a description of 
the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, which 
claim must be verified by the oath of himself or of some other person. Within 
30 days after filing said notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail 
by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real 
property a copy of the said notice of lien. Where the record owner's current 
address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the 
last known address of the record owner using for such purpose the names and 
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of 
the county where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail 
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner shall prevent the lien 
claimant from collection of interest or costs and attorneys* fees against the 
reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
[959] MECHANICS AND OTHER LIENS Ch. 170 
When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as stated 
above at the instance and request of an original contractor, then such subcon-
tractor's or person's lien rights, as set forth herein, are extended so as to 
make the final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold and claim a 
lien 80 days after completion of the original contract of the original contrac-
tor. 
Approved March 24, 1981. 
CHAPTER 170 
H. B. No. 191 (Passed March 5, 1981. In effect May 12. 1981.) 
MECHANIC'S LIENS » ITEMS COVERED 
AN ACT RELATING TO LIENS; PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR PERSONS WHO RENT 
EQUIPMENT OR MATERIALS UNDER THE MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 38-1-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 73, LAWS OF UTAH 1973. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last,amended by Chapter 
73, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read: 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien—What may be attached—Lien on ores mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or fur-
nishing oi renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, altera-
tion, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials 
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, speci-
fications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who 
have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a 
lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor or furnished or rented materialsf-,] or equipment for the 
value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials or equipment 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner 
or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor or other-
wise. Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in 
the property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, 
whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chap-
ter include products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the 
premises included within the lease. 
Approved March 27, 1981. 
TITLE 57—REAL ESTATE 
Chapter 
3. Recording Conveyances, 57-3-2. 
8. Condominium Ownership Act, 57-8-3, 57-8-6, 57-8-7, 57-8-10, 57-8-13, 
57-8-13.2, 57-8-13.4, 57-S-13.6, 57-8-13.8, 57-8-13.10, 57-8-13.12, 57-8-
13.14, 57-8-16.5, 57-8-18, 57-8-24, 57-8-27, 57-8-32.5, 57-8-35, 57-8-36. 
13. Solar Easements, 57-1 :M. 57-13-2. 
14. Limitation of Landowner Liability—Public Recreation, 57-14-1 to 
57-14-7. 
CHAPTER 1—CONVEYANCES 
57-1-3. Grant of fee simple presumed. 
Condemnation judgment. Board of Education of Granite School Disk, 
Fee simple title is presumed to be papsed 5*71 P. 2d 1336. 
by a condemnation judgment. Olsen v. 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice, etc. 
Forged deed. purchaser from the person who forged the 
The recording of a forged deed gives no deed takes nothing. Rasmussen v. Olsen, 
notice as to its contents and a bona fide 583 P. 2d CO. 
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes. 
After-acquired interest. by warranty deed to grantee, gave grantor 
Assignment to grantor of rights under n 0 rights under the outstanding lease and 
an outstanding lease of property at time n11 s u c h rights passed to grantee at time 
of conveyance, after grantor had purported o f tj l° assignment. Cox v. Ney, 580 P . 2d 
to convey the entire fee of such property 1083. 
CHAPTER 2—ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving conveyances. 
Comparable Provisions. Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
Jurisdictions which have enacted the shiie, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Uniform Acknowledgment Act are Ari- Pennbylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virgin 
zona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Ha- Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wy-
waii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Mary- ommg. 
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
CHAPTER 3—RECORDING CONVEYANCES 
Section 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice. 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice.—Every conveyance, or instrument in 
writing affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and certi-
fied, in the manner prescribed by this title, and every patent to lands within 
this state duly executed and verified according to law, and every judgment, 
73 
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order or decree of any court of record in this stale, or a copy thereof, re-
quired by law to be recorded in the office of the county recorder, and every 
financing statement which complies witli the provisions of section 70A-9-
402 shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, 
impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent pur-
chasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take 
with notice. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §2000; notice a? to its contents and a bona fide 
C. L. 1917, §4900; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, purchaser from the person who forged a 
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54. deed takes nothing. Rasmussen v. Olsen, 
583 P. 2d 50. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amendment inserted "and Priorities. 
every financing statement which complies Where deeds involved in two separate 
with the provisions of section 70A-9-402" conveyances contained descriptions of 
in the middle of the section; and made a land that overlapped, party who first re-
minor change in punctuation. corded notice of purchase prevailed. Wil-
son v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 
Forged deed. 503
 P 2 d 122Q. 
The recording of a forged deed gives no 
CHAPTER 5—PLATS AND SUBDIVISIONS 
57-5-1. Laying out land into blocks, lots and streets—Lawful. 
Law Eeviews. 
Preserving Utah's Open Spaces, Owen 
Olpin, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 164. 
57-5-3. Maps and plats to be acknowledged, etc. 
Approval under council-mayor form of by city council providing for such approval 
government. satisfies the approval requirements of this 
Under a council-mayor form of govern- section. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P . 2d 
ment, approval of subdivision plat by 1022. 
mayor pursuant to an ordinance adopted 
CHAPTER 8—CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP ACT 
Section 
57-8-3. Definitions. 
57-8-6. Ownership of units. 
57-8-7. • Common areas and facilities. 
57-8-10. Contents of declaration. 
57-8-13. Record of survey map to be recorded. 
57-S-13.2. Conversion of convertible land—Amendment to declaration—Limitations. 
57-8-13.4. Conversion of convertible spnee—Amendment to declaration—'Limitations. 
57-8-13.6. Expansion of project. 
57-8-13.8. Contraction of project. 
57-8-13.10. Condominiums containing convertible land—Expandable oondominiams— 
Allocation of interests in common areas and facilities—Requirements. 
57-8-13.12. Land to bo withdrawn or added to project—Applicability of restrictions. 
57-8-13.14. Easement rights—Sales offices and model units—Damage to property. 
57-8-16.5. Appointment and removal of committee and association members—Scope of 
authority—Period of control—Renewal of contracts—Failure to establish 
association or committee—Section construed in unit owners' favor. 
57-8-18. Blanket mortgages and other blanket liens affecting unit at time of first 
conveyance. 
57-8-24. Common profits and expenses. 
57-8-27. Separate taxation. 
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Rule 28 RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 514 
with this rule, they will nnt be filed, but shall be 
returned to be properly pi°pared 
(b) Form of other papers. 
(1) Petitions for rehearing. Petitions for re-
hearing shall be produced in the manner pre-
scribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, including 
the color requirements 
(2) Motions. Motions and other papers shall 
be typewritten upon opaque, ungla^ed paper 8V2 
by 11 inches in size Lines of tne typewritten text 
shall be double spaced and shall be typed on only 
one side of the paper Consecutive sheets shall be 
attached at the upper left margin 
(3) Caption A motion or other paper shall 
contain a caption setting forth the name of the 
court, the title o£ the case, the docket number, 
and a bnef descriptive title indicating the pur-
pose of the paper 
(c) Signature. Briefs, petitions, motions, and other 
papers shall be signed by counsel of record or by a 
party who is without counsel 
Rule 28. Prehearing conference. 
The court may direct the attorney s for the parties 
to appear before a panel of the court, a judge, or an 
appointed referee thereof for a prehearing conference 
to consider the simplification of the issues and such 
other matters as may aid in the disposition of the 
proceeding by the court The court, judge, or ap-
pointed referee shall make an order which recites the 
action taken at the conference and the agreements 
made by the parties as to any of the matters consid-
ered and which limits the issues to those not disposed 
of by admissions or agreements of counsel, and such 
order when entered controls the subsequent course of 
the proceeding unless modified to prevent manifest 
injustice 
Rule 29. Oral argument 
(a) In general. Oral argument will be allowed in 
all cases unless the court concludes 
(1) the appeal is frivolous, 
(2) the dispositive issue or set of issues has 
been recently authoritatively decided, or 
(3) the facts and legal arguments are ade-
quately presented in the brief and record and the 
decisional process would not be significantly 
aided by oral argument 
(b) Notice by clerk and request by a party for 
a rgumen t ; postponement. Not later than 30 days 
prior to the term of court in which a case is to be 
submitted, the clerk shall give notice to all parties 
that oral argument is to be permitted if requested 
and, if so, the time and place therefor and the time to 
be allowed each side Oral argument will not be 
scheduled unless a party requests the same in writing 
filed with the clerk not later than 15 da>s from the 
date of the clerk's notice A request for postponement 
of the argument or for allowance of additional time 
must be made by motion filed reasonably in advance 
of the date fixed for hearing 
(c) Order and content of argument. The appel 
lant is entitled to open and conclude the argument 
The opening argument shall include a fair statement 
of the case Counsel will not be permitted to read at 
length from briefs records, or authorities 
(d) Separate and cross-appeals. A separate or 
cross-appeal shall be argued with the initial appeal at 
a single argument unless the court otherwise directs 
If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff m the 
action below shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purpose of this rule unless the parlies otherwise 
agree or the court otherwise directs If sepaiate ap-
pellants support the bame argument care shall be 
taken to avoid duplication of argument 
(e) N o n a p p e a r a n c e of par t ies If the respondent 
fails to appear to present arg iment the roart will 
hear argument on behalf of the appellant it present 
If the appellant fails to apuear the court maj hear 
argument on behalf of the respondent if present If 
neither party appears, the case will be decided en the 
briefs unless the court shall otherwise order 
(f) Submiss ion on briefs. By agreement of the 
parties, a cas^ may be submitted for decision on the 
bnefs but the court may direct that the case be ar-
gued 
(g) Use of phys ica l exhibi ts a t a rgumen t , re-
moval. If physical exhibits other than documents are 
to be used at the argument counsel shall arrange to 
have them placed in the courtroom before the court 
convenes on the date of the argument After the argu-
ment, counsel shall cause the exhibits to be remo\ ed 
from the courtroom unless the court otherwise di-
rects If exhibits are not reclaimed by counsel within 
a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, 
they shall be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the 
clerk shall think best 
Rule 30. Decision of the court: Dismissal, not ice 
of decision. 
(a) Decision in civil cases . The court may re-
verse affirm, or modify any order or judgment ap-
pealed from If the findings of fact in a case are in-
complete, the court may order the trial court or 
agency to supplement, modify, or complete the find-
ings to make them conform to the issues presented 
and the facts as found from the evidence and may 
direct the trial court or agency to enter judgment m 
accordance with the findings as revised The court 
may also order a new trial or further proceedings to 
be conducted If a new trial is granted tne court may 
pass upon and determine all questions of liw in-
volved m the case presented apon the appeal and nec-
essary to the final determination of the case 
(b) Decision in c r iminal cases . If a judgment of 
conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otheiwise specified by the court If a ludgmtnt of con-
viction or other order is affirmed or modified by the 
court the judgment or order affirmed or modified 
shall be executed , 
\ (c) Decision and opinion m wri t ing, en t ry of 
I decision. When a judgment decree or order is re 
I versed, modifi* d, or affirmed by the court the reasons 
J therefor shall be stated concisely in writing and filed 
I with the clerk Any judge on the panel concurrirsr or 
J dissenting therefrom may likewise give the reasons 
I in writing and file the same with the clerk The entry 
I by the clerk in the records of the court shall consti 
J t u t e the entry of the judgment of the court 
(d) Notice of decis ion Immediately upon the 
entry of the decision the clerk shall give notice 
thereof to the respective parties and make the deci-
sion public 
Rule 31. Expedi ted appea l s decided after oral 
a r g u m e n t wi thout wr i t ten opinion 
(a) Motion and s t ipula t ion for expedi ted hear-
t i n g After the filing of all briefs in an appeal a party 
may move for an expedited decision without a written 
oninion The motion shall be accompanied by a atipu 
lation signed by all partieb on appeal specifically 
agreeing to submit the ca^e for decision without a 
written opinior pursuant to this rule The motion 
shall be in the fcrm prescribed by Rule 23 and, in 
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C ^ O av Court 
t te l l COw.it Gt repeals 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Jack C. Daniels appeals from a summary judgment in favor 
of Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, dismissing his 
notice to hold and claim a lien on property for which he was 
both a co-owner and the general contractor* Daniels* claim 
concerned the timeliness of filing his notice and the profits 
owed to him as a limited partner in Park Avenue Development 
Company {"Pdih Rifi'inuT), Tin Mill i mil I In Id Mill lii liin 
was B&th untimely and invalid. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1980, Daniels invested approximately $28,000 in the 
development of an eight-unit condominium project in Park City, 
Utah, thereby acquiring an interest through a limited 
partnership in Park Avenue. The agreement "between Park Avenue 
and Daniels provided that Daniels would receive—approximately 
$80,000 for his share in the profits from th^sale of the 
condominiums and for overhead. Park Avenue aSLs&~-ftired Daniels 
to serve as the general contractor for the condominium project 
and agreed to pay him approximately $15,000 for his services. 
On August 14, 1980, Deseret approved a construction loan 
to Park Avenue and construction on the project commenced. By 
the end of July 1981, Daniels had completed all of the 
construction required pursuant to the construction contract and 
Park City issued certificates of final inspection and occupancy 
for the project. Daniels was paid $15,000 for services and 
labor, but was not paid his promised share of the profits-from 
the sale of the condominiums. 
Apparently, Daniels intended to file a notice to hold and 
claim a lien on the project, for the $80,000 "profit," within 
the statutory period required for filing. However, the owners 
of the project were trying to obtain refinancing and they 
requested Daniels hot to file his mechanic's lien for the 
profit and overhead. In return, the owners promised Daniels 
that they would allocate his share of the profits to him within 
two weeks. In reliance on this promise, Daniels did not file 
his mechanic's lien within the requisite 100 day period. 
However, the promised payment was not. made. 
On December 1, 1981, several water pipes in the 
condominiums froze. The owners called Daniels to inspect the 
880135-CA 2 
pipes and to make repairs. Daniels inspected the pipes and 
made phone calls to subcontractors in order to facilitate 
repairs. On February 3, 1982, Daniels filed a notice of lien 
against the project, claiming a lien for the $80,000 "profit." 
He listed December 1, 1981, as the last day labor had been 
furnished on the project. 
In October 1983, Daniels filed a complaint against Deseret 
to foreclose his claimed lien on the property. Deseret's 
construction loan to Park Avenue was secured by deeds of trust 
which Deseret executed February 22, 1982, and recorded March 1, 
1982. Deseret subsequently moved to dismiss Daniels• complaint 
on the basis that Daniels1 lien was not filed in a timely 
fashion as required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1988) and 
therefore, Daniels had no cause of action as a matter of law. 
CEN Corporation, subsequent owner of the real property, also 
moved to declare Daniels' lien void. The trial court agreed 
that Daniels had not timely filed a mechanic's lien and 
therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Deseret and CEN 
Corporation. 
Daniels raises two issues on appeal: Did the trial court 
err when it found Daniels* work on December 1, 1981, did not 
extend the time limit for filing a notice to hold and claim a 
lien? Did the trial court err when it held Deseret is not 
estopped from raising the affirmative defense that the 
mechanic's lien was not timely filed? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A court may grant summary judgment if the evidence shows 
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because a summary judgment is a 
matter of law, the appellate court gives the trial courtfs 
conclusions no particular deference but rather applies the same 
standard as that applied by the trial court. Briaas v. 
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah App. 1987). However, "[o]n 
appeal from a summary judgment, we review the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the losing party." Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis- Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe 
Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). 
880135-CA 3 
TIME OF FILING - EXTENSION 
A general contractor must record a mechanic's lien within 
100 days after completion of the contract. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-7 (1988). Completion is marked by the end of a related 
series of tasks required for substantial completion of the 
contract. "Trivial or minor adjustments made casually or long 
after the main work is completed cannot be used to tie on to as 
the last labor done or materials furnished.19 Wilcox v. 
Cloward. 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, 6-7 (1936). 
Well over 100 days after completion of the contract, 
Daniels spent a day inspecting the damage from the frozen water 
pipes and calling subcontractors in order to make repairs. 
Daniels contends that this extends the period for filing his 
mechanic's lien. However, the trial court found: 
The work the owners wanted done in 
December of 1981 was not a continuation of 
the earlier project, but merely repairs. 
If repairs to a completed project could be 
construed as extending the time in which a 
mechanic's lien could be filed, mechanic's 
[sic] liens could be filed many years 
after a project had been completed. 
We agree with the trial court's findings. In order to 
extend the time for filing his mechanic's lien, the work 
Daniels did in December 1981 would have to substantially relate 
to the performance of the contract. -The work done or material 
furnished must be something substantia^ J41 connection with the 
performance of the contract and thigxfs not^  satisfied by 
trivialties which may be used as a/pretext to extend the lien 
period.- Palorobi v. P & C B\iilder&e_22^ah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 
325, 327 (1969). 
In Palombi. the original contractor argued that the date 
of completion was the date on which the building permit was 
obtained and some remaining building materials were removed 
from the property owner's residence. The court held that these 
were trivial activities in light of the substantial completion 
of the contract, and they could not be used to extend the date 
of completion. Similarly, the inspection and repairs 
undertaken by Daniels in December 1981 were not services used 
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of the 
building, nor did the services add directly to the value of the 
property. Therefore, the inspection cannot extend the time 
period for filing notice of a mechanic's lien. 
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SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED 
Daniels contends that Park Avenue and subsequent owners 
are estopped from pleading untimely filing of the notice of the 
lien as an affirmative defense because he was induced by the 
project owners not to file a lien within the requisite 100 day 
filing period. Deseret contends that it had no knowledge of 
the agreement between Park Avenue and Daniels and that it was 
not in privity with Daniels. Therefore/ Deseret argues, 
estoppel cannot be asserted against it. 
We do not need to reach the merits of the estoppel 
argument* Even if Daniels had filed a timely notice for the 
$80/000 owing to him for Hprofit and overhead/" this amount was 
not owed to him for the value of the services he rendered or 
for materials furnished but from his ownership in Park Avenue 
as a limited partner. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1988) provides 
that contractors/ subcontractors/ and laborers who furnish 
material/ provide services/ or bestow labor for the 
contruction# alteration/ or improvement of a building or 
structure shall have a lien upon the property for the value of 
the services and material provided. The value of the services 
provided by Daniels in his performance as general contractor, 
was approximately $15/000/ for which he was compensated.1 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law His to preclude 
landowners from having their lands improved by others/ without 
becoming personally responsible for the reasonable value of 
materials and labor." Cox Rock Prod, v. Walker Pipeline 
Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988). In order to ascertain 
when an improvement has been made upon the land/ for purposes 
of determining whether notice of a mechanic's lien can validly 
be filed/ it is necessary that '•there be an annexation to the 
land/ or to some part of the realty; or a fixture appurtenant 
to it, and this must have been done with the intention of 
making it a permanent part thereof." King Bros.. Inc. v. Utah 
Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254/ 256 (Utah 1S62). 
Daniels' claim is for the profits he was entitled to as an 
investor and not for any services or materials that he provided 
1. It is undisputed that approximately $15/000 was paid to 
Daniels for his services as contractor. What the "overhead" 
represented is unclear. In any case, failure to properly 
preserve the lien right precludes any claim that this overhead 
should be the subject of a lien. 
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as a contractor. The profits a person is entitled to as the 
result of an investment do not constitute improvements to the 
realty nor do they fall within the statutory meaning of 
services or materials as contemplated in the mechanic's lien 
law statutes. Accordingly, Daniels9 notice to hold and claim a 
lien, for the profits allegedly owing to him, is invalid. 
Therefore, the summary judment in favor of Deseret is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jack 
v. 
Dese 
> C. Daniels, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiff and ) 
Appellant, ) 
iret Federal Savinas & Loan ) 
Association, A-One 
Inc., Miller Brick 
E. Doms and Michael 
Respondent, 
Construction, ) 
Sales, Eugene ) 
. R. McCoy, ) 
Cen Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
Jack C. Daniels, Debra Estes, ) 
Scott Berry, Debra Ann Sitzberger ) 
and Amy Stanton Eagleson, ) 
Defendantso ) 
ORDER 
Case No. 880135-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the Appellant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 26th day of April, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary*T/ Noonan 
ClerkMsf the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April, 1989, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Robert C. Cummings 
Attorneys for Appellant, Daniels 
225 South 200 East, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David R. Olsen 
Carl F. Huefner 
Charles P. Sampson 
Attorneys for Respondent, Deseret Federal 
700 Clark Learning Office Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Third District Court 
Summit County 
Civil 6790 
Julia C. Whitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
i.C. 
I L E D 
C'*rJ< of ':urml{ Cr.unf* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICTMr-££ 5 T RiGSE—. 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JACK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants. 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Third Party Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 6790 
This action was brought by the plaintiff to determine among 
other things, the validity of a lien filed by defendant Daniels 
on February 3, 1982. Daniels then brought a third party action 
against third party defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Association. 
The undisputed facts are that Daniels is a contractor who 
performed certain services, and furnished labor and materials used 
in the construction of a building on the real property in question, 
The project was a condominium located in Summit County, Utah. 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
DANIELS, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The deposition of Jack Daniels indicates that by the end of July, 
1981 all construction pursuant to the Building Contract Agreement 
had been completed. Certificates of Final Inspection and Occupancy 
were issued by the City of Park City, Utah. 
On or about December 1st of that year, several pipes in the 
condominium burst. The owners of the condominium contacted Daniels, 
and requested that he begin the necessary work to make adequate 
repairs. Daniels, as set out in h'is deposition of September 30, 
1983, indicates that he contacted several subcontractors in 
anticipation of beginning work. Prior to any work being done on 
the project by any contractors or subcontractors, the owners 
advised him that he did not need to make the repairs for reasons 
best known to themselves. 
As indicated above, Daniels filed his mechanic's lien 
on February 3, 1982, and shortly thereafter Deseret Federal filed 
its Trust Deed. 
Daniels also claims that the time in which he could file his 
mechanic's lien was extended by virtue of an agreement he had 
with the owners. 
Deseret Federal now moves to dismiss claiming that Daniels1 
mechanic's lien was not timely filed. 
Daniels counters by saying that the last work done on the 
project was done in December of 1981, and further he was given an 
extension of time by the owners in which to file his lien. 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
DANIELS, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
A careful review of the facts shows that the project was 
completed in July of 1981, and that the work the owners wanted done 
in December of 1981 was not a continuation of the earlier project, 
but merely repairs. If repairs to a completed project could be 
construed as extending the time in which a mechanic's lien could 
be filed, mechanic's liens could be filed many years after a 
project had be^n completed. Therefore, the lien in question could 
relate back only to the amount of work done during December of 1981. 
Deseret Tederal, however, claims that the lien is invalid 
since no work was actually done by Daniels on the project. It 
is undisputed that no improvements were made to the project, and 
that Daniels' only involvement was to contact various subcontractors 
and craftsmen. 
A close reading of Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, indicates that there are three distinct categories of 
persons who are entitled to file a lien in situations of this type. 
Addressing them in reverse order, these persons are licensed 
architects, engineers and artisans who furnish designs, plats, 
plans and estimates of costs. The next category are those persons 
involved in mining, and the location and/or working of oil and gas 
deposits. The last category, which is mentioned first in the 
statute, is the category of contractors, subcontractors and 
all other persons. In this Court's opinion, Daniels falls in 
the contractors category. The only other category he could possibly 
4) ° ^  
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
DANIELS, ET AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
fall into would be on the basis that he provided an estimate of 
costs. Construing the deposition of Mr. Daniels in his favor, the 
Court must conclude that he was not hired to furnish an estimate of 
costs, but rather to make repairs. This Court believes that the 
correct interpretation of the statute is that to fall within the 
third category in the statute in question, a person must be one 
hired specifically to estimate costs. To rule otherwise would 
mean that a contractor who takes on a job on a cost-plus basis, 
and without telling the owner what the cost of the project would be, 
would be in one category, whereas the contractor who gave a bid 
would fall in another category in the event both were to file a lien 
for the work they performed in contacting subcontractors. To 
reach such a result would seem to be nonsensical and absurd. 
For this reason, this Court believes that the only conclusion that 
can be reached is that Mr. Daniels falls within the first category 
mentioned in the statute. 
The second and third categories differ from the first category 
m one notable way. That is the requirement placed upon those 
failing within the first category that the services, materials or 
equipment must be "used in the construction, alteration or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement." This 
requirement is not typical to the second two categories. 
There is a brief statement of the legislative history of 
^he predecessor of the statute in question contained in Zions First 
*~ o O 
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National 3ank vs. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970). 
Based upon this legislative history, it would appear that the 
distinction between the first category and the second and third 
categories is that on many occasions engineers and architects do 
a substantial amount of work which does not per se improve the 
property, and further is not visible upon an inspection of the 
property. An architect and engineer may work many months in 
preparing plans, preparing renderings, and making computations. 
In fact, the bulk of the work done by an architect and engineer, 
with the exception of supervision, is done off the property site. 
This likewise holds true for work done on mining claims for oil 
and gas deposits. A geologist may spend many hours reviewing 
maps and locate prior deposits in a neighboring region, and yet 
never visit the site. For these reasons, this Court is of the 
opinion that the distinction between the first category and the 
second and third categories is a valid one, which takes into account 
the problems of those persons involved in the construction and 
design of real estate projects, as well as the development of 
mining and fossil fuel deposits. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the 
opinion that Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson, supra, does 
not apply to the facts here. In Zions First National Bank, the 
lien claimant involved fell into the third category rather than 
the first. It is for this reason that the Court stated that the 
O '1' / 
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plans for the erection of a building need not be used in the 
erection of the building; 
It appears to this Court that since the activities of Daniels 
in December of 1981 are not services used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of the building, nor did the services 
add directly to the value of the property, the work done in 
December of 1981 cannot extend the time period in which Daniels was 
to have filed his lien. See, Cald'er Brothers vs. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) . 
Daniels also makes the claim that if the lien was not timely 
filed, Deseret Federal is estopped from making that claim since 
Daniels had an agreement with the owners which allowed for the 
late filing of a lien. In support of this proposition, Daniels 
cites the case of Beltline Brick Company vs. Standard Home Building, 
213 N.W. 41 (Minn. 1927). This seems to be contrary to Utah law. 
See, Smith vs. Oregpn Short Line Railroad Company, 30 Utah 246, 
84 P. 108 (1906), and Utah Savings and Loan Association vs. Mecham 
12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961). The court in Smith vs. Oregon, 
Short Line, stated that in order to establish an estoppel against 
a mortgagee, the lien claimant must establish certain facts. He 
must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act or 
declaration by the mortgagee. There is no evidence to indicate 
that any of these events occurred. If the law were to the contrary, 
it would allow owners and individual mechanic lien claimants to 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
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determine the priority of other lien claimants, whether they were 
other mechanic lien claimants, or holders of trust deeds and 
mortgages. This would create confusion in the law, which would be 
intolerable. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the lien 
of Daniels is null and void as to Deseret Federal. Deseret 
Federal's Motion is granted. Counsel for Deseret Federal is 
directed to prepare an Order in accordance with this Decision, and 
have the Order either approved as to form, or he should adhere 
to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courtc 
Dated thi s fep day of April, 1984 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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-and-
GEORGE A. HUNT 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Third Party 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
JACK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
-v-
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Civil No. 6790 
The motion of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan Association came on regularly for hearing 
before this Court on March 5, 1984, the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier, District Judge, presiding, George A. Hunt of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau and A. Dean Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs 
appearing for Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association and Gordon A. Madsen of Madsen & Cummings 
appearing for Third-Party Plaintiff Jack Daniels, and the 
Court having heard argument of counsel and having reviewed 
the memoranda on file with the Court and having requested 
supplemental memoranda from counsel and the same having been 
filed, and the deposition of Defendant and Third-Party Plain-
tiff Jack C. Daniels having been published and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and having rendered its Memorandum 
Decision in the matter on April 6, 1984, granting the motion 
of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion 
to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association be and the same hereby is granted and judgment 
is rendered in its favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff Jack 
C. Daniels, no cause of action. 
DATED this Z{ t . day of April, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
o •' <?>•'.. 
« TPhil ip R. F i s h i e r , D i s t r i c t Judge 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kay I. Brown, being duly sworn, deposes and states: 
that she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Association herein; that she served the attached 
Summary Judgment, Summit County District Court, Civil No. 
6790 upon the following by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Gordon Madsen, Esq. 
320 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Bullock, Esq. 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr., Esq. 
6914 South 3000 East, #205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
James M. Dean, Esq. 
61 South Main, #403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey Brown, Esq. 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carmen E. Kipp, Esq. 
Karen J. McClurg 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq. 
Suite 1000, 10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and mailing the same, postage pre-paid on the ilth day of April, 
1984. 
fa/i fl/tn^y^ 
1984. 
Subscribed and sworn to befor^ me this Ilth day of April, 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing at: 
/7 ~^ ~ 
BJILDING CONTRACT AGREEMENT. 
J D CONSTRUCTION ^ 
Jack C. Daniels, General Contractor 
THIS AGREEMENT, made this 14th day ofAugust in the year one 
thousand nine hundred and 80 by and between JACK C. DANIELS, J D 
CONSTRUCTION party of the first part (hereinafter designated the 
CONTRACTOR), and MICHAEL McCOY, KENNETH SITZBERGER, RESORT CONSJLTANTS, 
LTD., a Utah general partnership, JML, a Utah limited partnership, 
party of the second part (hereinafter designated PARK AVENUE DEVELOP-
MENT COMPANY). 
WITNESSETH that PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT CpUPANT, in consideration of 
the fulfillment of the agreements herein made by the CONTRACTOR, agrees 
with the said CONTRACTOR, as follows: 
Article I. The CONTRACTOR under the direction and to the satis-
faction of PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, shall and will provide all 
the materials and perform all the work mentioned in the approved draw-
ings and specifications. 
Article II. PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall furnish to the 
CONTRACTOR, all drawings or explanations as may be necessary to detail 
and illustrate the work to be done and the CONTRACTOR shall conform to 
the same as part of this contract so far as they may be consistont with 
the approved drawings and specifications. 
It is mutually understood and agreed that all drawings and speci-
fications are and remain the property of PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT 
CO.iPANY. 
Article III. No alterations shall be made in the work shown 
or described by the drawings and specifications. 
-1-
Article IV. The CONTRACTOR shall provide sufficient, safe and 
proper facilities at all times for the inspection of the work by 
PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY or their authorized respresentatives. 
Article V. Should the CONTRACTOR at any time refuse or neglect 
to supply a sufficiency of properly skilled workmen, or of materials 
of the proper quality, or fail in any respect to prosecute the work 
with promptness and diligence, or fail in the performance of any of 
the agreements herein contained, such refusal, neglect or failure 
being certified by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall be at liberty, 
after 14 days written notice to the CONTRACTOR, to provide any such 
labor or materials, and to deduct the cost thereof from any money then 
due or thereafter to become due to the CONTRACTOR under this contract? 
and if PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall certify that such refusal, 
neglect or failure is sufficient ground for such action, PART AVENUE 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall also be at liberty to terminate the employ-
ment of the CONTRACTOR for the said work and to enter upon the prem-
ises and take possession, for the purpose of completing the work 
comprehended under this contract, of all materials thereon, and to 
employ any other person or persons to the work and to provide the 
materials therefor; and in case of such discontinuance of the employ-
ment of the CONTRACTOR he shall not be entitled to receive any further 
payment under this contract until the said work shall be wholly fin-
ished, at whirh time, if the unpaid balance of the amount to be paid 
under this contract shall exceed the expense incurred by PARK AVENUE 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY in finishing the work, such excess shall' be paid 
by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY to the CONTRACTOR, but if such 
expense shall exceed such unpaid balance, the CONTRACTOR shall pay 
the difference to PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
Article VI. The CONTRACTOR shall complete the several portions, 
and the whole of the work comprehended in this Agreement by May 
15, 1981 provided that the CONTRACTOR shall have control and 
authority to provide any and all subcontractors and laborers. The 
CONTRACTOR shall also have control over all disbursements on the con-
struction loan. PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall be at liberty 
to examine CONTRACTOR'S books pertaining to this Agreement at any time 
without notice, but only during normal working hours. 
Also provided that all preliminary financial arrangements shall 
be completed by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY on or before 
August 15, 1930 in order that construction may be initiated by 
the CONTRACTOR. 
Article VII. Should CONTRACTOR be obstructed or delayed in the 
prosecution or completion of his work by the act, neglect, delay or 
default of PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, or of any other contractor 
employed by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY upon the work, or by any 
damage which may happen by fire, lightning, earthquake or cyclone, or 
by the abandonment of the work by the employees through no default of 
the CONTRACTOR, then the tine herein fixed for the completion of the 
work shall be extended for a period equivalent to the time lost by 
reason of any or all the causes aforesaid; but no such allowance 
shall be made unless a claim therefor is presented in writing to 
PARK AVEVUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY within Pive days of the occurrence 
of such delay. The duration of such extension shall be certified 
to by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, but appeal ^rom their de-
cision may be made to arbitration. 
Article VIII. It is hereby mutually agreed between the parties 
hereto that the sum to be naid by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT CO.IPANY to ,
 r / 
A 7 or>r\r\ "jv* '/-^ 
t h e CONTRACTOR f o r s a i d work and m a t e r i a l s s h a l l be $ 3 0 6 f 0 0 0 . 0 0 JK W 
^(cVvT^ rKiNOft50i\»»f>J*rTV SEL>QV / \ ^ o / M > ^ ; ^ W 7 
EIOUMttfSlMlCD FIVE THOUSAND AND OO/HTQ- D o l l a r s p lu s p r o f i t and ^, 
overhead of >gT|361»Q0 E ^ t f ^ - - ^ ^ SIXTY-ONE 
AXJ}_IIQA&Q- Do 11 are
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This payment shall be made within 60 days after this contract 
is fulfilled. 
If at any time there shall be evidence of any lien or
 tclaim for 
which, if established, PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY or the said 
premises might become liable, and which is chargable to CONTRACTOR, 
PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall have the right to retain out 
oP any payment then due or thereafter to become cfue an amount suffi-
cient to completely indemnify him against such lien or claim. Should 
there prove to be any such claim after all payments are made, CON-
TRACTOR shall refund to PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY all monies 
that the latter may be compelled to pay in discharging any lein on 
said premises made obligatory in consequence of CONTRACTOR'S default. 
Article IX. It is further mutually agreed between the parties 
hereto that no certificate or final payment, shall be conclusive evi-
dence of the performance of this contract, either wholly or in part, 
and that no payment shall '>e ejn^traed to '»f» an acceptance of defec-
tive work or improper naterials. 
Article X. PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall during the 
progress of the work maintain full insurance on said work, in his own 
name and in the name of CONTRACTOR, against loss or damage by fire. 
The policies shall cover all work incorporated in the building, and 
all materials for the same in or about the premises, and shall be made 
payable to the parties hereto, as their interest may appear. 
Article XI. The said parties for themselves, their heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns, do hereby agree to the full performance of 
the covenants herein contained. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this AGREEvlENT the 
day and year first above written. 
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ADDENDUM TO BUILD INC} CONTRACT AGREEMENT 
DATED AUGUST 14, 1930 BETWEEN JD CONSTRUCTION 
AND PART AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
1. Contractor acknowledges receipt of full set of working drawings 
and specification sheets. 
2. Any change orders or modifications of the building specifications 
must be in writing and signed by an authorized representative 
from JD Construction and Park Avenue Development Co. 
3. This building contract agreement is subject to JD Construction 
and MILAJACK, et. al, obtaining financing as outlined under 
the Earnest Money agreements dated April 4, 1980, May 20, 1930 
and July lf 1980 and signed by the above mentioned parties. 
4. Contractor agrees to review with developer subcontractor and 
material bids and where feasible to ue alternate sources 
which may be more cost efficient for the project without 
jeopardizing the quality of construction. Any cost savings 
would be subtracted from the total bid. 
DATED August 14, 1930 
I 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
MOST ALL OP Mr' WORK HAD BEEN DONE AS AN INDIVIDUAL. 
AND OF COURSE MIKE AND LARRY HAD MORE KNOWLEDGE IN THIS SIDE 
OF THE SPECTRUM THAN I HAD, SO I DIDN !T KNOW HOW TO APPROACH 
IT, 
MIKE AND LARRY KNEW HOW TO APPROACH IT, AND SO 
WE PORMED A CORPORATION AND A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN WHICH 
TO ENTER INTO OUR AGREEMENT WITH PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME HOW MUCH INVESTMENT VANCE MCDONALD 
WAS PROPOSING THAT YOU MAKE OR WAS ASKING OR--. 
A WE BOUGHT 20 PERCENT OF THE PROJECT FOR $80,000. 
Q HOW DID THAT $80,000 FIGURE COME ABOUT? 
A THIS WAS WHAT THEY OFFERED US, 20 PERCENT OF--I MEAN 
THIS WAS THE COS1 THAT THEY OFFERED US; 20 PERCENT OF THE 
PROJECT FOR $80,000. 
Q SO YOU AND MR. DANGERFIELD AND MR. LINNELL GOT 
TOGETHER AND FORMED SOME SORT OF A--SOME SORT OF AN ENTITY 
Or SOME KIND? 
A WE FORMED A CORPORATION, MILAJAK. THAT WAS TAKEN 
i| 
FROM MIKE AND LARRY AND MY NAME. 
I Q OKAY. WHAT WAS MILAJAK SUPPOSED TO DO IN THE 
SI 
22 J 
S3 « 
?A 
°NCJ-:CT? 
A '/ELL, I DONFT--I MEAN I TOLD YOU JUST PART OF IT. 
T
 J U ' T — D U KNOW, I'M A CARPENTER AND THAT SIDE OF IT I KNOW, 
HUf V IS C/.nr.R SIDE I WOULD HAVE r " j , U U KNOW, LEAVE- -1 REALLV 
j ! DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THAT ST'MHTURE \ c . 
GtNfRALCO U MrP'"RTE flS 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Q WHAT ABOUT JML? WAS THERE SOME KIND OF A 
PARTNERSHIP OR SOMETHING PUT TOGETHER CALLED JML? 
A RIGHT. THAT WAS'IN RESPECT TO THE CORPORATION. 
IT WAS—WHAT LITTLE I REMEMBER--IT WAS THAT WE NEEDED A 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO GO INTO THE—YOU KNOW, AS A JOINT 
VENTURE. 
NOW, I'M NOT SURE I RIGHT KNOW THAT I UNDERSTAND 
WHY OR — WITHOUT WORDS. 
Q DID YOU EVER RECEIVE ANY PAPERS FROM MR. DANGERFIELD 
OR MR. LINNELL REGARDING THE FORMATION OF MILAJAK? 
A WELL, VERN ROMNEY WAS OUR ATTORNEY. WE APPROACHED 
VERM. HE DREW UP ALL THESE PAPERS FOR US AND RECORDED THEM. 
NOW, THIS IS ALL I CAN TELL YOU. WHETHER VERN WAS THE ONE 
THAT RECORDED THEM OR NOT, HE DREW THEM UP. 
Q OKAY. WAS THAT TRUE OF JML PAPERS, TOO? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOUR AGREEMENT WITH MR, DANGERFIELD AND MR, 
LINNELL REQUIRE THAT YOU PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CASH, 
AND MR- MCDONALD PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CASH, AND MR. 
LIMMELL PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CASH? 
r\ WELL, I DONTT KNOW ABOUT MCDONALD, WE--. 
MR. MADSEN: I THINK YOU MEANT DANGERFIELD. 
0 EXCUSE ME, I MEANT DANGERFIELD; [fM SORRY. 
A TH!§ WAS OUR—YOU KNOW, WE ALL TRIED TO GET--WE 
BROUGHT IN ANOTHER MEMBER INTO JML, AND HIS NAME WAS KENT 
11 
EXAM BY KINGHORN 
F U L L E R . AND KENT FULLER PUT UP SOME MONEY, I PUT UP SOME 
MONEY, M I K E PUT UP SOME MONEY, AND LARRY D I D ; AND I T TOTALLED 
OUT TO $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 , WHICH WE G A V E . 
Q DO YOU RECALL HOW MUCH MONEY YOU PUT UP. PERSONALLY? 
A $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 . 
Q $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 ? AND DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY THE REST 
OF THEM PUT UP? 
I T WOULD JUST BE A GUESS. I B E L I E V E THAT KENT PUT 
UP $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 AND MIKE COME UP WITH $ 1 8 , 0 0 0 , AND LARRY COME 
UP WITH THE REMAINDER. BUT T H A T ' S A GUESS, YOU KNOW; I KNOW 
THE AMOUNT THAT I PUT U P . 
Q OKAY. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN AN-Y TAX RETURNS OR OTHER 
DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN F I L E D FOR TAX PURPOSES FOR JML? 
A M I K E WAS HANDLING THAT PART OF I T , AND I B E L I E V E 
THE ATTORNEY VMS GREEN, A MAN NAMED GREEN. I DON r T KNOW 
H I S F I R S T NAME. 
MR. MADSEN: JOHN? JOHN GREEN I N THE JUDGE 
B U I L D I N G ? 
A WELL , I T - - G R E E N WAS H I S NAME, AND M I K E HAD TO H I R E 
HIM, 
Q D I D THEY EVER G I V E YOU ANY SCHEDULES FROM JML THAT 
YCU F . L E r WITH YOUR TAX RETURNS THAT SHOWED T H I S INVESTMENT 
AND HOW I T WOULD BE TREATED FOR TAX PURPOSES, I F YOU CAN 
R E C A L L f 
A NO, I JUST HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE. M IKE HANDLED I T , A N D - -
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY PARTNERSHIP DOCUMENTS OR JML AT 
THIS TIME? 
A NO, I DON'T. IN FACT LARRY OR MIKE OR GREEN HAS 
THEM. I DON'T HAVE. 
Q OKAY. I IMAGINE IT TOOK SOME PERIOD OF TIME TO 
GET ALL OF THIS ORGANIZED AND PUT TOGETHER, AND MOST OF THAT 
TIME WAS SPENT IN THE SPRING OF 1980; IS THAT A FAIR 
STATEMENT? 
A THE FIRST TIME THAT I WAS IN CONTACT WITH MCDONALD 
V/AS IN APRIL OR--CL05L' 10 THAT PERIOD 01 TIME, AND WE HAD 
U '! FROM THEN UNTIL--IT WAS TV/0 OR THREE MONTHS, YOU KNOW, 
OF COURSE I DON'T KNOV/ WHAT DATE WE HAD THE 
CORPORATION FORMED OR THE JML. I HAD APPROACHED MIKE AND 
LARRY AFTER I HAD TALKED TO MCDONALD. 
Q DID YOU KNOW THE NAMES OF ANY OF THE OTHER PEOPLE 
WHO WERE PUTTING MONEY INTO THIS, INTO THE INVESTMENT IN 
THIS BUILDING? 
A I UNDERSTOOD IT WAS MCCOY, SITZBERGER, MCDONALD, 
BOLDON, AND PAUL LANDES. 
Q DID YOU EVER HEAR THE NAME "PARK CITY INVESTORS I" 
DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME? 
A NO, BUT I KNOW OF IT NOW. AL THAT TIME I COULDN'T 
~!R'_L YOU WHETHER I HAD OR NOT, I COULD HAVE, BUT--
I. Q OKAY. WERE YOU EVER PROVIDED A COPY OF A JOINT 
11 
j VENTURE AGREEMENT THAT HAD THE NAME 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Q WELL, I MEAN, LET'S LOOK AT THE LAST PAGE OF THIS 
ADDENDUM. THIS HAS THE SAME SIGNATURES ON THE SAME SIGNATURE 
PAGES AS THE MAIN BUILDING CONTRACT ITSELF; ISN'T THAT 
CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q WELL, I CAN'T SEE ANY DIFFERENCE. 
MR. MADSEN: NO. 
A NO, LARRY SIGNED AND I SIGNED. 
Q OKAY. AND THAT WAS--THAT BUILDING CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT THAT'S PART OF EXHIBIT 110 IS AN AGREEMENT THAT 
GOVERNED YOUR ACTIVITIES AS A CONTRACTOR.IN PHYSICALLY 
ERECTING THE BUILDING AND BRINGING IN THE SUBCONTRACTORS 
AND GETTING PAID FOR ALL OF THAT; IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. WAS THE BUILDING STARTED WHEN THIS CONTRACT 
WAS SIGNED? • - • 
A YES, WHEN THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN WAS GRANTED, 
THAT'S WHEN THIS WAS SIGNED, THE SAME DAY. BEFORE WE 
SIGNED THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN, THOUGH, THEY READ THIS OVER. 
THERE WAS--I THINK MCCOY READ IT, BOLDON READ IT, AND 
MCDONALD. 
AND WE WENT OVER IT, BECAUSE THERE WAS A QUESTION 
ON f?;E PROFIT ON IT, THE TOTAL AMOUNT. 
m, MADSEN: THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE 
' |j c,QNS:f'ftueT!ON—. 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Q I ' L L FOLLOW UP. 
A NO. 
Q WHAT WAS THE QUESTION ABOUT THE PROFITS THAT CAME 
UP THAT YOU JUST TESTIFIED ABOUT? YOU SAID SOME QUESTION 
CAME UP ABOUT THE PROFIT ON IT, AND CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT 
THAT? 
A WELL,. I THOUGHT WE WAS SPEAKING ON THIS CONTRACT. 
ON THIS CONTRACT THERE WAS A CROSSED-OUT--IT HAD BEEN 
CROSSED OUT, YOU KNOW. I FIGURED WHEN I TYPED THE CONTRACT 
UP I WAS FIGURING THE PROFIT ON $875,000. 
Q OKAY. 
A BECAUSE I HAD NO IDEA WHAT THE BANK WAS GOING TO 
HOLD BACK AND WHAT THERE WOULD BE IN THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN 
ITSELF. 
Q OKAY. 
A AND USUALLY I TAKE MY PROFIT FROM THE HARD COST 
OF THE CONSTRUCTION, AND THIS IS WHERE WE WORKED THIS OUT 
AND DERIVED THIS OTHER FIGURE FROM THAT FIGURE AFTER I 
HAD ALL THE INFORMATION IN FRONT OF ME. 
Q OKAY. SO THIS FIGURE THAT WAS WRITTEN IN HERE 
ON PAGE h OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, IF 1 CAN READ IT 
LIP'S IDE DOWN, IS—THERE'S A FIGURE THERE FOR THE MAIN COST 
OF THE BUILDING, WHICH LOOKS LIKE $797,000. 
AND THEM IT SAYS, "PLUS PROFIT AND OVERHEAD OF"--IS 
THAT $80,253? 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
A WELL, THAT INCLUDED — LET'S SEE IF I CAN--THIS 
$80,250 INCLUDED THE PROFIT AND OVERHEAD TO THE COMBINED—NOW, 
IT SEEMED TO ME LIKE THE PROFIT, THAT WAS $ 72,000, AND THE 
OVERHEAD WAS $7,500 OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. AND IT 
TOTALED THE $ 8 0 , 2 5 3 . 
AND I GOT THAT FROM--AFTER I FOUND OUT THIS FIGURE 
OF $ 7 9 7 , 0 0 0 . 
Q SO YOUR PROFIT WAS INTENDED TO BE ROUGHLY 10 PERCENT 
OF THE HARD COST; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A RIGHT, AND THAT'S WHAT I FIGURED; 10 PERCENT OF THE 
HARD COST. 
Q OKAY. BEFORE YOU SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT OR GOT THE 
CONSTRUCTION LOAN, HAD YOU GONE UP TO PARK CITY AND KNOCKED 
DOWN ANY OF THE OLD HOUSES OR DONE ANY CLEARING WORK OR 
ANY EXCAVATION OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT ON THE PROPERTY? 
A NONE WHATSOEVER. I HAD LOOKED AT THE PROPERTY, 
AND I HAD CONTACTED THEM, MY SUBS, TO SEE WHAT I HAD. 
MY EXCAVATOR HAD SEEN THE PROPERTY SO WE COULD SEE 
ABOUT WHAT WE HAD TO DO TO REMOVE THE OLD HOUSES THAT WAS 
ON 'rHE PROPERTY AND LEVEL IT. 
Q WAS THERE A PORTION OF YOUR ESTIMATE THAT WAS 
ALL.' SATED TC THE DEMOLITION OF THE OLD HOUSES AND SO FORTH? 
A Y E S . 
O 0HAV, 
A NOW, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT WOULD BE. IT WAS A TOTA! 
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EXAM BY J E F F S 
A NO, I WAS N O T . 
Q HOW WAS I T YOU L E A R N H ) ABOUT I T ? 
A THEY SUED " I E . THEY PRESENTED ME WITH A SUMMONS 
SUING ME FOR HALF A M I L L I O N DOLLAkS FOR F I L I N G AN I L L E G A L 
L I E N . 
Q AND YOU LFARNED ABOUT T H E I R BOND I N CONNECTION 
WITH THAT PROCEEDING? 
A E V I D E N T L Y THROUGH THE PROCESS OF T H I S T H I S WAS 
LEARNED. I D O N ' T - - Y E 5 , I T WAS LEARNED THROUGH MY ATTORNEYS 
WHO LEARNED T H I S , WHAT K I N D OF A BOND THEY HAD POSTED. 
Q A L L R I G H T . NOW, GOING BACK TO T " E T I M E FROM THE 
PERIOD OF T I M E WHEN YOU COMPLETED YOUR CONTRACT FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION, D I D YOU AT THAT T I M E C L A I M SOME INTEREST I N 
THE PROPFRTY I N TERMS OF OWNERSHIP? BY THAT I MEAN NOT 
BY REASON OF YOUR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT BUT BY REASON OF 
SOME OWNERSHIP I N THE J M L - - . 
A J O I N T VENTURE? Y E S , S I R . WE CLA IMED 20 PERCENT I N 
THAT PROJECT I N THE J O I N T VENTURE, JML D I D . 
Q OKAY. JML CLA IMED 20 PERCENT OWNERSHIP? 
A Y E S . 
Q A M ) YOU C L A I M E D OWNERSHIf I N J M L ; I S THAT R I G H T ? 
A Y E S . 
0 NCW, AND ! B E L I E V E YOU S A I D THAT DANGERFIELD AND 
'•rW L i r i N E L L WBRK THE OTHER TWO PARTNERS I N J M L ; I S THAT 
CORRECT? 
GfcKi. JAL COURT HEPORTRS 
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D'AM BY JEFFS 
A AND KENT FULLER. 
Q AND KENT FULLER. OKAY. AND THAT WAS--WAS THAT 
A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP OR A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP? 
A I REALLY CAN'T TELL YOU, BECAUSE I JUST--ALL I C A N -
IT'S A PARTNERSHIP, AND MY CONCERN WAS NOT REALLY WITH THAT. 
I MEAN 1 INVESTED IN IT. I WAS TOLD THAT WE COULD MAKE A 
SUBSTANTIAL PROFIT ON THE BUILDING, AND MY CONCERN WAS PUTTING 
THAT BUILDING UP AND DOING THE BEST JOB THAT I COULD DO IN 
THE BUILDING IN HOPES FOR MORE WORK, A FUTURE. 
Q I BELIEVE YOU SAID THAT LATER THERE WAS A DISCUSSION 
BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARTNERS IN JML ABOUT TRANSFERRING OR 
DEEDING THAT INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY TO MICHAEL MCCOY, AND 
THAT AS YOU MET TOGETHER YOU DID NOT FAVOR MAKING THE 
TRANSFER AND THEY DID; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES, THAT IS RIGHT. MY FAITH HAD DIMINISHED 
SLIGHTLY WITH MCCOY AND I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY YOU TAKE AND 
HAND HIM THE V/HOLE BASKET WITHOUT AT LEAST HAVING YOUR HAND 
ON THE HANDLE. 
Q NOW, I GATHER, HOWEVER, FROM WHAT YOU'VE SAID, 
THAT AFTER THAT MEETING WHEN YOUR PARTNERS SAID THEY WANTED 
TO DO THAT, YOU ALLOWED THAT TO BE DONE? 
A THEY ONLY NEEDED TWO SIGNATURES. 
Q SO THEY COULD BIND YOU BY THEIR SIGNATURES? 
A YES, SIR. 1 GUESS THAT'S WHAT THEY COULD. I 
REALLY DON'T KNOW, RUT THAT'S —FROM WHAT I'VE UNDERSTOOD 
CEMEFIAL COURT REPORTERS 
J DALE }. OHNSON ^ASSOCIATES 
Suite 700 
New'iouso Rui'd n y 
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NOTICE OF LIEN 
\<J 
^ 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned Jack, C, Danie l s __- _J_D Cons-trjiction 
doing business as _. 
ifeSl_jlojro\An_ 
_ General Contractor 
-County of SftJLt LflJk_e_ 
and residing at 
State of Utah, hereby claim 
and intend- to hold and claim a lien upon that certain land and premises, owned and reputed to be 
owned by Tf\ U^AAJJI^ &> 7A C* CSK4
 } 1JSSW £&>*^a* » DJJUA&JX 6*£e^ and 
situate, lying and being in PaxlL-Hi t y , County of jSnmmi t 
State of Utah, described as follows, to wit: 
1039 Park Avenue, Eight Unit Condominium Park City, Utah 
Lots 8. 9. 10. 23. 24. 25 and the Southern one-half (1 /2) 
of lots 11 and 22, Block 4, Park City Survey, according to 
the official plat thereof on file and of recorjL_uj_the _5ujnmjit 
County Recorder's O f f i c e ^ I r,.i,u M „ - J L 6 & 2 & S : 
fCyisytAs^ n^s PcUiJz. Gsvt-e^KjL+jL-
CL-Y&J7& terJkttL j /hAfc^aK^L 
—Entry Mu 
RECOPnrf) &*&*& 
BIQU1 
*EE 
$ Y&3 
iNDErarrr: 
U » - a ^ 
to secure the payment of the sum of 18 CU253.. 
owing to the undersigned for QQJasJLHlCJtXQJL-
„ Dollars, 
L=i!lP A.JC o ndojnxrLLum. 
General Contractor 
m, on and about the. ..Pecgniber I , 1981 ..on said land 
That the said indebtedness accrued and the undersigned furnished said materials to (or was em-
(Eraa* •eeordias to th* fact) 
Jack C. Daniels ~ J D Construction ployed by) 
. _who was the 
Contractor 
aforesaid, under aJ3uil< 
Company 
owner and the reputed owner of said premises as 
contract made between the said- J?!?!^*!^®!! 1 - „ 
and the undersigned 
on the ~ B t h _ d a y of~AU£SLSdL_ ~, 19..J3P,
 Dy the terms of which the undersigned did agree 
to construct eight unit condominium 
and the s a i d _ 2 ? y < ^ 1 ^ 2 . </2 <7VU* (AS^
 y <&*w £&+tf~^ *-&^%^^-&-£*^^ - -
did agree to pay the undersigned therefor as follows, to wit: _ S l x ty_-d ay_S __&£!«. E- t i l l a 
cnnt.ract.-jraa f u l f i l 1 eji 
____ . _and under which said contract the under-
signed did _ furn i sh „ the first l a b o r &_jn_ate.rials_ on the 2bth. _ day of 
^„August-.J-9J8Iland did _Jf uxnxsiL _ _ _thelast - Xabor _ on the 
day of December. 1981 _ _ and on and between said last mentioned 
amounting 
_ Dollars, 
1 s t _ 
days, did 
to the sum of 
furnish labor 
$80,253.00 
which was the reasonable value thereof, and on which the following payments have been made to wit 
NONE 
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of J&8D*.2.5J2L QX2 - ~ 
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which 
demand the undersigned hold and claim „ a hen by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, of Title 
38, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. / >i /I 
/ V J a c k C. Danie ls - J I) Construct ion 
*3C 
CD 
CD 
CD 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of £aXt-Lake. 
Jack C. Daniels 
h 
. being first duly sworn, says that he is 
Jd^. ..claimant—, in the foregoing Notice of Lien ; 
that he has heard rtau a»iu uuuue mm HHUWB the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his 
own knowledge. 
/Osubscfib icri eoVan&sworn to before me this 
^unv^Arl ' 
•<\ 
' <1 
, 1 9 ^ 
Notary Public. 
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GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant Daniels 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK C. DANIELS,, et al., 
Defendants. 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, A-ONE CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., MILLER BRICK SALES, 
EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R. 
McCOY, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant/third-party plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels, by 
these presents, adopts and realleges the provisions of the Answer 
and Counterclaim and the Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim 
heretofore filed in the above-entitled action. 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Third-party plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels, complains and 
alleges as follows: 
AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM and 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 6790 
1. Third-party defendant, Deseret Savings & Loan 
Association, is a Utah corporation engaged in the mortgage lending 
business with principal offices in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah; third-party deieauant, ,A-One Construction, Inc., is 
a Utah corporation with principal offices in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah; third-party defendant, Miller Brick Sales, is a Utah cor-
poration with principal offices in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
third-party defendants, Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. McCoy are 
residents of the State of California. 
2. Third-party defendant, Deseret Savings & Loan 
Association, claims some interest in the subject matter, the real 
property located in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, by 
virtue of eight trust deeds recorded in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder as Entries 189008 - 189015, Book M213, Pages 411 
through 442 inclusive, dated February 22, 1982, and recorded 
March 1, 1982. 
3. Third-party defendant, A-One Construction, Inc., 
makes some claim in the real property, the subject matter of this 
lawsuit, by virtue of a mechanic's lien recorded April 30, 1982, 
Entry No. 19097 at Book M218, Page 537, filed in the office of 
the Summit County Recorder. 
4. Third-party defendant, Miller Brick Sales, claims 
some interest in the real property located in Park City, Utah, the 
subject matter of this lawsuit, by virtue of a mechanic's lien 
recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder May 18, 1982, 
-2-
Entry No. 191542, Book M220, Page 33. 
5. Third-party defendant, Eugene E. Doms, claims some 
interest in the real property located in Park City, Utah, the sub-
ject matter of this lawsuit, by virtue of a Notice of Interest 
recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder May 20, 1982, 
as Entry No. 191631, Book 220, Page 173. 
6. Third-party defendant, Michael R. McCoy, pursuant 
to a Complaint, Affidavit and Amended Complaint filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. C-82-4628, 
alleges that the real property in question is owned by "Park Avenue 
Development, a Utah joint venture" and that he, Michal R. McCoy, 
has acquired the interest of all joint venture parties and is 
accordingly owner of the premises, the real property located in 
Park City, Utah, the subject matter of this lawsuit. 
7. All of the said interests of the third-party 
defendants are junior to, and therefore inferior to, the lien of 
defendant/third-party plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels. 
V7HEREFORE, defendant/third-party plaintiff, Jack C. 
Daniels, prays that the court foreclose defendant/third-party 
plaintiff's mechanic's lien and that defendant/third-party plain-
tiff have judgment as against plaintiff and third-party defendants 
and that the court order that said property be sold, or so much 
thereof as may be necessary as provided by law to satisfy the 
terms of said lien and the applicable statute, including interest, 
accrued costs and attorney's fees, and should there be a 
-3-
deficiency resulting from said sale, that defendant/third-party 
plaintiff be given judgment against plaintiff1and third-party 
defendants for such deficiency. 
jlLi fL j^~^/7 
/fGpRDON A. MADSEN ^> 
(OtiERT C. CUMMINGS 
^ttorn^ys for Defendant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels 
320 South Third1East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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/ernon B. Romney 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Robert C. Cummings 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Jack c. Daniels 
320 South Third East 
Salt take City, Utah 34111 
Telephones "(801) 322-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK c. DANIELS, DEBRA 
ESTES, SCOTT BERRY, DEBRA 
ANN SITZBERGER, and AMY 
STANTON EAGLESON, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 6790 
1.Comes now the Defendant JACK C. DANIELS and answers 
Plaintiff's verified Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
2.Said verified Complaint rails to state a claim against 
this answering Defendant' upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
3. Answering paragraph 1 thereof admits that Plaintiff 
appears as record owner of the real property described in 
said paragraph, admits that CEN CORPORATION has some equitable 
ownership therein and otherwise denies the allegations of said 
paragraph 1. 
4. Admits that he has recorded a Notice of Lien relating 
to said property and otherwise denies the allegations of said 
paragraph 2. 
5. Denies the allegations of paragraph 3 and 4C 
6. Answering paragraph'5, said Defendant incorporates as 
his answer,thereto his Answers as hereinabove set forth. An-
swering paragraph & admits? that he recorded a Notice of Lien, 
that a copy thereof is annexed hereto as Exhibit A and speaks 
for itself and otherwise denies the allejations of paragraph 6. 
7. Denies the ailegationsof paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. 
8. In- answering paragraph 10 this Defendant adopts as his 
answer thereto his answers as hereinabove set forth. 
9. Denies the allegations of paragraph 11 and 12. 
10. Answering paragraph 13 adopts as his answer thereto 
lis answers as hereinabove set forth. 
11. For lack of Information and belief denies the alle-
rations of paragraphs L4r 15, 16 and 17. 
12. Answering paragraph 18, adopts as his answer thereto 
tis answers as hereinabove set forth. 
13. For lack of Information and belief denies the allega-
tions of paragraphs 19, 20 and 21. 
14. Answering paragraph 22 adopts as his answer thereto 
lis answers as hereinabove set forth. 
15. For lack of information denies the allegations of para-
graphs 23, 24 and 25. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff, Defendant 
FACK C. DANIELS alleges as follows: 
l.( Plaintiff;is indebted to Defendant JACK C. DANIELS 
m the sum of $80,253,00 together with interest as
 Gf Auqust 
>6, 1980 for materials and labor furnished by PlaintLff to Defen-
iant on premises described on the attached Notice of Lien, which 
jien is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. That on or about February 2, 1982, the Defendant 
;imely and in accordance with law filed said Notice of Lien in 
:he Office of the Recorder of Summit County, Utah. 
3. That the said real property described in said 
Jotice of Lien is security for payment of the aforesaid debt and 
-2-
the said Notice of Lien has priority over any interest of 
Plaintiff in said property. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the Plaintiff's verified 
Complaint be-dismissed and for judgment on his Counterclaim as 
follows? 
That the Court determine the amount due to Defendant 
from Plaintiff including interest and costs and that said Notice 
of Lien be foreclosed in accordance with the law and the practice 
of this Court and that the property, or so much thereof as may 
be necessary, be sold as provided by law to satisfy the afore-
said amount owing together with interest accruing costs and 
should there be a deficiency resulting from such sale, that 
Plaintiff be given judgment against Plaintiff for said deficiency. 
\!k> t". Cu^ 
Gordon A. Madsen#Vernon u< uomhey and 
Robert C. Cummings 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Jack C. Daniels 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer 
and Counterclaim was delivered to Plaintiff, CEN Corporatior 
addressed to Charles C. Brown, Spencer & Brown, Suite 1200, 
Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, by placing it in U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid on 
this >fr day of March, 1982. 
utL ¥' ^L~-
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GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant finiels 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah Mill 
Telephone 322-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT C »M|H' (F SUMMi'I ( OWITY, STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintif t, 
vs. 
JACK C, DANIELS, et al . , 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
A*ii:*'DMENT TO VJT.VPR 
A'JD COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil NO. 6790 
As a Third Delense, defendant, ^ack C. Daniels, allou^s 
as follows: 
Prior to expiraf-'or of th- »i r>tu*-rry period for filn.j 
a mechanic's lien in tu> matter, Pichie] McCoy, in behiJf i i 
plaintiff's predecessors, tc-wit, fli.'hiel McCoy, Kenneth Sit >-
berger, and Resort Con ultants, Ltd., -\nd/or Park Avenue Dr\oi la-
ment, and/or 1039 Park A^ r nu<* Devel )pix»*nt , requested de<orvL<nt 
not to file a mechanic's liei withL t the time permitted b/ i ^ v 
and stated to him that ii he would -ofcam from filing, lu.3 ^laim 
v^ ould be paid within two ee;.s. Plimtiff'r. said predec. 5f3ci c 
have failed to honor that renresent.it ion ind this defendant his 
teen paid nothing and was required *-o file a Lien, and by virtue 
of tie aforesaid circumstances the period for filing mechanic's 
lien has been extended, and defendant's mechanic's lien ha^ r ccn 
tamely filed under the ri icunstance ? of this case, or an -h-* 
alternative the plaintiff and its predecessors are estopped *-n 
assert that said mechanic's ien war; n')t timely fil^d. 
. Ui-=- --—_ _UL-L 
ROBERT r. CUMMINGS 
\t\ornc/ for Defendant Daninis 
Served a cop;, •„•! the for< < oi KJ OJI Keith W. Meade, 
attorney for the plaint Jif, this; ': 1 day of June, J 932, by 
personallydeliveriiv to him a copy uf: the same. 
-';• V . 
